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This paper deals with a “new” type of monetary policy making: Inflation Targeting
(IT). It attempts to identify reasons for which countries might be inclined to adopt this
framework for monetary policy. By reviewing recent experience of inflation targeting
countries, the paper outlines the major operational arguments regarding the
implementation of IT. Another important issue is the applicability of IT in transition
countries: in the light of EU (and, in the longer run, EMU) accession, Inflation
Targeting might be an interesting policy framework to at least some countries in
Central and Eastern Europe.
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In 1989, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act introduced, among other important
institutional features, a new monetary policy framework. In a Policy Targets
Agreement (PTA) between the government and the central bank, numerical targets for
the inflation rate were set out. This technique of conducting monetary policy has
become known as Inflation Targeting (IT). Soon thereafter, other countries, all small-
to medium-sized advanced economies, followed the New Zealand example (in
chronological order): Canada (1991), Israel (1991), United Kingdom (1992), Sweden
(1993), Finland (1993), Australia (1993), and Spain (1994). Recently, Korea selected
price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy. Since the Bank of Korea is
supposed to set an explicit target in terms of inflation (and to implement monetary
policy accordingly) one might want to consider Korea as a future member of the IT
community
1.
While there is no exact definition of IT that is generally agreed upon, the countries
mentioned above share most of the following features. Firstly, low and stable inflation
is not just one of several targets, but referred to as the overriding goal of monetary
policy. This results, secondly, in the public announcement of quantitative targets for
the inflation rate over a certain time horizon. Thirdly, the central bank forecasts future
inflation and compares its forecast to the intended rate of inflation. A deviation is met
by adjusting the monetary policy instrument. Finally, IT takes another step to foster
transparency in monetary policy matters by explicitly promoting the communication
of monetary policy making to the public.
One major reason for the adoption of IT as monetary policy framework had been the
partly unsatisfying experience with intermediate targets during the 80s and early 90s.
Whereas low and stable inflation has been among the ultimate targets of monetary
policy for most countries (at least) since the first oil shock in 1973, it proved
convenient for the policy maker to rely on an intermediate target such as a monetary
aggregate or the exchange rate. These targets had two advantages: firstly, they
responded quite accurately (and quickly) to the instruments of monetary policy, and
secondly, inflation was empirically tied to this intermediate target via a stable4
relationship in most economies for a long time. Financial sector deregulation during
the 80s and the increasing instability of the demand for money during the 90s have,
especially in Europe (German Unification and European Monetary Union in Western
Europe, the decline of communism in Central and Eastern Europe) profoundly
undermined the stability of intermediate targets (velocity shocks)
2.
More specifically, countries in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced a
difficult period of transition during the last decade. Severe output decline together
with strong inflation marked the turn from centrally planned economic systems to
market-based economies. The rise of unemployment and growing international trade
linkages necessitated prudent fiscal and monetary policies. The perspective of joining
the European Union serves as an overarching goal, stressing the need for policy
coordination. Furthermore, these countries will have to prove on institutional grounds
that they have reached a certain level of economic development, including the
capacity and the will to conduct sustainable fiscal and monetary policies.
This paper addresses several issues: in the following chapter, some background is
provided on why IT might serve as a monetary policy framework. Section 3 briefly
explores the prerequisites for IT and some of the more common operational problems
in detail. In addition, we want to highlight how the implementing countries have dealt
with some of these operational issues. In chapter 4, the focus is shifted towards the
outcome of IT in terms of inflation performance. The following section turns to the
important question of whether IT might be a viable monetary policy framework for
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), especially those acceding the
European Union (EU). Section 6 concludes.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1 See Hoffmaister (1999) for a detailed discussion of the Korean case.
2 This holds for the U.S., too, see Friedman (1996).5
2 The rationale for Inflation Targeting
In this chapter, we will identify the rationale behind adopting IT as monetary policy
framework. Why should countries modify their monetary policy stance, including
fundamental changes in central bank constitutions?
One simple, but promising answer is due to the former way of policy conduct that was
no longer functional. To start, we will briefly explore why the predominating method
during the 70s and much of the 80s, namely intermediate targeting of a monetary
aggregate, became more and more flawed so that a wide variety of countries moved
on to target other variables.
The next question to surface is which variables might be of interest for the monetary
authority. Or, to put it the other way round, what variables can monetary policy
effectively dictate? Not surprisingly, we find that in the long run, inflation is the only
macroeconomic variable influenced by monetary policy decisions and, hence, the key
variable or target for monetary policy.
Given that monetary policy is likely to target a specific level of inflation, we are
making the case for low and stable inflation. With regard to the diverse –but difficult
to identify– costs of inflation
3, we will focus on two arguments, namely on the
assertion that in presence of tax distortions, inflation accounts for major welfare
losses and, on the other hand, on the link between inflation and long run growth.
2.1 Intermediate monetary targeting and the power of monetary policy
The collapse of the  Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system necessitated new
monetary policy strategies. In Europe, several countries – Germany and Switzerland
being the most prominent – started targeting a monetary aggregate. The underlying
idea is simple: given that low and stable inflation is commonly agreed as the ultimate
goal, the monetary authority will find it easier to control the intermediate monetary
target than the goal variable inflation, provided a stable relationship exists between
money and inflation
4. The central bank will then chose a specific definition of the
monetary aggregate (the broader, the less controllable) and a policy “rule”, ranging
                                                                
3 For example, the notorious “shoe leather costs” first identified by Bailey (1956), but also costs arising
from inflation variability, not only the level of inflation, see  Romer (1996), chapter 9.8 for a
summary.
4 The classic reference is Goldfeld (1973).6
from very strict Friedman-type k per cent money growth to pragmatic, outcome-
oriented behavior.
The  conditio sine qua non in intermediate money targeting, i.e., the strong
relationship between money and inflation turned out to become weaker in most
adhering countries from the mid 70s onwards
5. The major reasons for this
destabilization are believed to be financial sector innovation (credit cards) and
increased capital mobility. Both developments blur exact definitions of money and
alter the money velocity coefficient.
Consequently, most countries have moved on to target variables other than money.
There are countries, however, where the relationship is still believed to exist. In
Germany, the Bundesbank has repeatedly made the point that no significant structural
change has occurred, and that money demand is sufficiently stable in order to conduct
money aggregate targeting
6. Therefore, the Bundesbank officially chose not to follow
the trend towards IT
7.
The identification of the empirical relationship between inflation and unemployment,
known as the Phillips curve
8, provided a strong argument in favor of activist monetary
policy during the 1960s in order to keep output at or even above full employment
level for sustained periods. The belief in monetary activism became clouded with the
“natural rate hypothesis” gaining prominence. According to this prevailing view, there
is a “natural” level of unemployment in the economy – the so-called “non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” or NAIRU – not  to be continuously
overcome by activist policy. In other words, monetary means cannot permanently
effect real economic variables
9, there is no long-run trade off between inflation and
unemployment. As a consequence, economic benefits of expansive monetary policy in
terms of output (or lower unemployment) are of limited duration while the costs of
higher inflation in terms of economic inefficiencies tend to be permanent. Hence, a
                                                                
5 See Goldfeld (1976) or, for an overview, Goldfeld and Sichel (1990). In this sense, the relationship is
a good example for Goodhart’s law. As soon as the regularity had been detected, it became unstable.
6 See, e.g., Bundesbank (1996), p. 72.
7 See however the discussion in footnote  56 below.
8 See Phillips (1958).
9 The natural rate hypothesis rests on Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968), see also Lucas (1972). In this
context, the emphasis lies on “permanently”: Friedman acknowledges the powerful (but short run)
effects of monetary policy on the economy in Friedman and Schwartz (1963).7
“pragmatic case”
10 can be made that monetary policy is to focus on economic
variables within its reach in the long run, namely the inflation rate.
2.2 The benefits of low inflation
In this section we will focus on two widely discussed arguments in favor of price
stability as the primary goal of monetary policy. Whereas a distorted tax system
“automatically” incorporates economic costs in terms of foregone growth, the direct
link between inflation and growth is statistically significant, but not yet completely
understood in theory.
Apart from these specific arguments in favor of low inflation, there is a broad
consensus among economists that “price stability promotes an economic system that
functions more efficiently”
11, and, hence, works as a prerequisite for other economic
goals. FISCHER (1994) provides an exhaustive listing of the real effects of inflation by
categories
12. He argues that the economic cost of inflation-related distortions can sum
up to 2-3 per cent of GDP already at a relatively low inflation rate of 10 per cent. One
category of the real effects of inflation mentioned by Fischer refers to institutional
settings, namely the tax system.
2.2.1 Tax system distortions
Standard public finance theory emphasizes the non-neutral character of tax systems
due to the non-existence of lump-sum taxes (“second-best solution”). This holds even
with inflation not being present. Distortions related to inflation arise in different parts
of the tax system, namely capital income taxation, but also personal income taxation.
With capital income taxation, distortions are created by the provision of most tax
administrations to tax nominal rather than real interest payments. In fact, nominal
interest taxation and inflation may add up to a negative real return.
A popular phenomenon in personal income taxation is the so-called bracket creep.
With a tax system based on nominal income, doubling an individual’s income at an
inflation rate of 100 per cent will result in a higher real tax burden, because the
individual is pushed into tax brackets with higher marginal tax rates. This is true for
                                                                
10 As opposed to the more theoretic argument based on the time-inconsistency literature, see McCallum
(1996).
11 Mishkin (1997), p. 13.
12 See. op. cit., p. 272ss.8
any type of progressive tax system, even such systems with a flat rate, as long as
exemptions and deductions are expressed in nominal terms.
The straightforward solution to these distorting effects of inflation on taxation is to
index the tax system. However, there are strong theoretic and practical arguments
against this remedy, e.g. the concern that indexing will reduce the public’s awareness
of inflation
13.
Another way to minimize distortions resulting from this tax-inflation interaction
would be to neutralize inflation, in IT terms, to aim not only at low levels of price
increase, but at a zero inflation target. FELDSTEIN (1996) has underlined that due to
the presence of distorted tax schemes, the annual welfare loss of even a two per cent
inflation rate amounts possibly to one per cent of GDP. He argues that the one-time
cost of going from low to zero inflation is more than outweighed by the multi-period
gain in returning to a second-best taxation scheme without inflation
14.
2.2.2 Inflation and growth
As we have seen, a case can be made on Phillips-curve grounds for positive short-
term effects of surprise inflation on output/employment. As the inflation-
unemployment trade off breaks down in the longer run, the picture also changes for
long-term effects of inflation on economic growth. Until the 1970s, the empirical
evidence regarding the positive or negative impact of inflation on growth was, at best,
mixed. In recent years, several empirical studies have underlined the costs of high
(and variable) inflation in terms of economic growth.
FISCHER  (1993) includes low and stable inflation as the cornerstone of a stable
macroeconomic framework, which is, in turn, a necessary condition for sustained
economic growth. In a growth accounting framework, he argues that inflation has
detrimental effects on economic growth by substantially reducing investment and the
rate of productivity growth. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom of the
                                                                
13 See Feldstein (1996), chapter 7.
14 As Feldstein puts it: “The deadweight loss associated with the shift from zero inflation to a two per
cent inflation rate is therefore not the traditional ‘small triangle’ that would result from distorting a
first-best equilibrium, but is the much larger ‘trapezoid’ that results from increasing a large initial
distortion” (p. 5). He estimates the one-time cost to be equal to between 4 and 6 per cent of initial
GDP. Depending on the discount rate, the present value of the benefits deriving from price stability
exceeds the cost of getting there within six to nine years.9
1950s and 1960s, when the  Mundell-Tobin effect predicted a positive impact of
inflation on capital accumulation due to portfolio restructuring away from money
15.
BRUNO AND EASTERLY (1998) go one step further by pointing out that the described
inflation-growth regression is closely linked to discrete episodes of high inflation, i.e.
it is statistically observable only with high-frequency data and single high inflation
observations. They conclude that the rate of growth is significantly reduced during an
inflation crisis, but strongly recovers once inflation is reduced to “normal” levels.
This threshold level of inflation is suggested to be around 40% per annum with no
significant inflation-growth correlation below this figure
16.
SAREL (1996) focuses on the non-linear effects of inflation on economic growth. He
finds a structural break at 8% CPI per annum. Below this level, inflation is not found
to have strong effects on economic growth. Above 8%, however, a powerful negative
impact exists. Not taking into account this type of structural break explains in
SAREL’S view the fact that many studies in the past have found the overall effect
(above and below the structural break) not to be highly significant, statistically.
Summing up, a case can be made for low inflation as the “cornerstone” of a stable
macroeconomic framework, contributing significantly to long-run growth. Also,
distortions in the tax system become costly in terms of foregone GDP already at very
low levels of inflation. Thus, the adoption of a monetary framework based on an
explicit inflation target should be oriented towards low levels of inflation.
                                                                
15 Other advocates in favor of a negative inflation-growth relationship are  Barro (1995), and De
Gregorio (1992). Levine and Zervos (1993) find the relationship to be extremely fragile and attribute
its statistical significance to single high-inflation-negative-growth observations.
16 Fischer (1993), p. 503, reaches the opposite conclusion: “It is thus not the case, as I had expected,
that it is the high inflation outliers that are responsible for the overall negative correlations between
inflation and growth… Rather the association between inflation and growth…is stronger at the low
and moderate inflation levels than at high inflation.”10
3 Inflation Targeting: framework or rule?
The issue of monetary policy effectiveness has been discussed for many decades
along the lines of the prominent rules-versus-discretion debate. In a nutshell, it has
been argued that only strict rules permit the central bank to be fully credible and
hence overcome the problem of time-inconsistency
17. Discretion in monetary policy,
on the other hand, allows for a reaction to external shocks and reduces the negative
effects on output and growth. The downside is that discretion introduces an
inflationary bias, if the central bank’s output target lies above society’s target, because
the monetary authority might not be able to credibly commit to an inflation target.
Turning the argument around, a credible central bank will be able to (at least partly)
remove the bias.
In light of this debate, merely all monetary policy procedures from simple base money
rules to the many variants of money targeting can be classified as less or more
discretionary. It has been argued that IT finds its place in the (mildly) more
discretionary part of the spectrum
18.
However, communication of monetary policy issues can be considered an integrative
part of IT. The more open and transparent the process of policy formulation becomes
to the public, the more the central bank is implicitly tied to “rules”. Consequently,
several authors have placed IT on the rules side of the spectrum
19.
Again others have made the point that IT can not be classified along the rules-versus-
discretion scheme, that “…this is not the best way to think about inflation targeting.”
In their view, “ there is no such thing in practice as an absolute rule for monetary
policy” and that, hence, monetary policy can only be classified as more or less
discretionary, but never as “rule-based”. They perceive IT as a new “…framework for
policy within which ‘constrained discretion’ can be exercised”
20.
Without further investigation into this nearly philosophical question, we want to
assess in this chapter the characteristics of Inflation Targeting as the process of
monetary policy making.
                                                                
17 This problem was introduced in a seminal article by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
18 See Masson et al., p. 18 and table 1.
19 See Friedman and Kuttner (1996).
20 See Bernanke et al. (1999), p. 21, p. 5 (italics in original), and p. 22. Their book provides a good
introduction to the rules-versus-discretion debate.11
We try to follow the logical order of policy implementation: before deciding on a
certain type of policy, one has to make sure that this policy can be effectively
installed. In other words: research has indicated a number of prerequisites for IT. In a
second step, the paper focuses on the process of implementation: among the
operational issues, a clear-cut target definition is fundamental to successful inflation
targeting. Thirdly, we try to evaluate the role of communication between the monetary
authority and the general public. With inflation being a final instead of an
intermediate monetary goal, the process of monetary policy formulation becomes less
straightforward. Hence, there is a growing need for communication with the public,
since the understanding of monetary policy contributes strongly to the credibility of a
central bank and therefore to its policy performance. A complete understanding of the
monetary authority’s behavior on the other hand reduces its discretion in policy
making, simply because a certain, rule-like reaction is expected. That is, the central
bank acts under “constrained discretion”.
3.1 Prerequisites
Work done mainly by the IMF
21 points to two fundamental criteria for
implementation of an IT framework: so-called fiscal non-dominance and non-
multiplicity of monetary policy targets.
The first criterion relates to the link between fiscal and monetary policy, more
precisely to the assignment of the policy target. On some occasions, the fiscal
policymaker might be able and willing to dictate monetary policy. However, in order
to guarantee acceptable policy performance, the monetary authority should be able to
independently choose its policy instruments. The latter criterion is of more general
nature: as it is well known, more goals than instruments in policy making will prove
difficult to handle. Hence, there is a question of target competition
22. The question of
the right target goes hand in hand with another major problem in monetary policy
theory, which is fundamentally a measurement problem, but commonly referred to as
“nominal anchoring”.
                                                                
21 See Debelle (1997) and Masson et al. (1997).
22 Since both criteria are seemingly fulfilled by the (well-developed!) countries actually targeting
inflation, we will only briefly outline the argument in this part of the paper. We will deal more
closely with these prerequisites in the section on Perspectives for Central and Eastern Europe, p.  33.12
3.1.1 Target assignment and fiscal non-dominance
The problem of fiscal dominance in monetary policy is closely linked to the heavily
discussed issue of central bank independence (CBI). Important contributions in the
literature have focused firstly on the positive measurement of CBI
23 and, secondly, on
the normative features of CBI, i.e. why should a central bank be independent and to
what extent. In recent years, central banks worldwide have gained increased
independence from the fiscal policy maker. This is obviously the case for transition
countries, but also for most EMU members and the inflation targeting community.
The degree of independence varies across countries, however. This is of major
importance when it comes to the assignment of monetary policy goals.
DEBELLE AND FISCHER (1994) introduced the distinction between goal and instrument
independence. Following them, a central bank is said to be goal independent, if it has
the power to set its own goals. It is, in turn, instrument independent, if the goals of
monetary policy are exogenous to the monetary authority, i.e., assigned in its charter
or by the government
24,25. A consensus seems to emerge that a successful central bank
should be to a large extent instrument independent, but not necessarily goal
independent
26. The possibility to freely decide over the instruments of monetary
policy rests on the fact that there are no constraints of fiscal nature, in other words, no
signs of fiscal dominance.
Spill-over effects from fiscal to monetary policy might be due to (non-negligible)
government borrowing from the central bank, to an underdeveloped taxation system
relying on seigniorage revenues, to insufficient financial markets or to explosive
dynamics of the public debt.
IT as monetary policy strategy requires instrument independence in order to remove
the central bank from the daily fiscal policy agenda, but not necessarily goal
                                                                
23 See, e.g., the indices by Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993), and the “Turnover Index”
by Cukierman et al. (1992). All these indices in principle show a positive correlation between CBI
(as measured) and successful monetary policy in terms of low inflation.
24 This distinction is closely linked to “solutions” of the time-inconsistency problem: the Rogoff-type
conservative central banker is goal independent in that he chooses an inflation target different (lower)
from the public, the Walsh-type central banking agent is supposed to fulfil a contract in which the
goals are set out, but the central banker retains independence in the choice of instruments. See Rogoff
(1985) and Walsh (1995).
25 IT countries differ in the way, inflation targets were announced for the first time: joint agreement
between government and central bank (Canada, New Zealand) or announcement by the central bank
with governmental endorsement later on (Australia, Sweden).
26 See e.g. Masson et al. (1997) and especially Debelle and Fischer (1994). Romer and Romer (1996a)
hold the opposite view.13
independence. In fact, extreme goal independence (as it was the case for the
Bundesbank) will reduce the authority’s accountability within democratic
institutions
27.
3.1.2 Nominal anchoring and competing goals of monetary policy
A nominal anchor serves to tie down the public’s expectations about the future. In
absence of any numéraire, the monetary policymaker would not be able to commit to
any sort of policy strategy. Hence, temporary shocks to the price level could alter the
public’s expectations in a substantial way, making monetary policy difficult.
Accommodating the expected rise in inflation will endanger the central bank’s
reputation, tight monetary policy, on the other hand, bears the risk of recession. Thus,
there is a firm need for expressing forecasts and expectations in terms of an “anchor”.
By credibly committing to such a longer run target the central bank can communicate
its willingness to conduct coherent policy. Taking the nominal anchor as a means of
communication and commitment also leads to the conclusion that an anchor, which is
well understood by the public, will lead to superior policy outcomes. Within the IT
framework, the communication of a specified inflation target to the public identifies
the price level the central bank is aiming at in the future and serves therefore as a
nominal anchor.
Apart from IT, however, we conceive several other nominal anchors or goals, which
also contribute to control the public’s expectations. While within the IT framework,
the inflation target constitutes the nominal anchor, secondary goals might only be
pursued, if they are consistent with the inflation target. Common goals of monetary
policy include an exchange rate target, wages together with a full employment target,
the national income level or financial sector stability.
The argument is straightforward for the exchange rate: given that monetary policy is
endogenous in the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime, an inflation target cannot
coexist. The case is weakened for “semi-fixed” exchange rate regimes where
currencies fluctuate within a band centered on a parity value. Especially if the band is
rather wide, there will be room for secondary targets. The underlying question is
which target is estimated to be the more important one. Since price stability is the
overarching goal of IT, pegging the exchange rate too rigidly will endanger the
                                                                
27 See Communication, accountability, and transparency, p.  25.14
fulfillment of the low inflation target. Hence, “true” IT will override in conflicting
situations any exchange rate target.
In this context, we want to make another point: inspecting well-known examples of
exchange rate pegging, we note that countries often chose this strategy in order to
overcome a credibility problem: they tied their hands together and to a prominent low
inflation country in order to commit to sound monetary policy
28. This is the case for a
variety of Central and Eastern European countries, which have pegged mostly to the
Deutschmark or the Euro (then ECU). For them, as argued in more detail in chapter 5,
targeting a particular currency relies on the same rationale than targeting the inflation
rate directly. Turning the argument around, we should expect countries from exactly
this group to become future inflation  targeters (given that the prerequisites for
successful IT be fulfilled).
The reasoning we made for possible conflicts between the overriding inflation goal
under an IT framework and a secondary exchange rate goal is also valid for other
goals. If they are non-competing, no conflict will arise. If they are, instead, not
consistent with each other, the IT framework demands a credible commitment to the
inflation goal. Consider the full employment goal: the Phillips curve states an
inflation-unemployment trade off. In terms of IT, this means that low inflation policy
is not contributing to full employment. But, as it is well known, this trade off holds
only in the short run. In the long run, low and stable inflation provides a sound
background for private sector decisions and contributes positively to the employment
target. There is actually a considerable amount of evidence that high inflation
endangers long-run growth
29.
As far as financial sector stability is concerned, we note that this is a goal of monetary
policy, but also a prerequisite of IT. The importance lies in the fact that
underdeveloped financial markets will lack the correct functioning of interest rates.
Also, they might not be “deep” enough to accommodate major public or private debt
instruments. Little empirical work has been done on the role of the financial sector in
monetary policy and its impact on policy formulation and economic growth
30.
                                                                
28 See for the Italian case Giavazzi and Pagano (1988).
29 See Inflation and growth, p. 8.
30 See Johnston and Pazarbasioglu (1995).15
Especially in the former communist states, financial sector deregulation is moving at a
remarkable pace. Consequently, the role of the financial sector in these countries is
subject to continuous redefinition.
Summing up, there seems to be no dichotomy between the goal of low and stable
inflation under an IT framework and the stability of the financial sector.
Along these lines, the US constitute a good example for no explicit nominal anchoring
at all, no policy framework has been indicated. The Fed’s monetary policy follows
what has been called a “just do it” strategy
31. Comprehensive monitoring of inflation
indicators goes in hand with “preemptive strikes” in case of inflationary threats. As it
is well known, this “look at everything” strategy has made the Fed one of the world’s
most respected hawks in monetary policy matters. On the other hand, the US
economy has performed successfully since the mild recession in 1990. It seems that
even without a clear and visible target or anchor, a central bank can do good work as
long as the strategy is credible. In addition, if there is an anchor, monetary policy
becomes the easier the more credible the anchor is.
3.2 Operational issues
So far, we have outlined why a country might want to modify its monetary policy
framework in order to implement IT, and what the prerequisites, in rather abstract
terms, for such a policy stance are considered to be. In this section, we will turn to
more practical problems of implementation.
By definition, Inflation Targeting implies the formulation (and announcement) of a
monetary policy target. To start, we will discuss the different aspects of the target
definition. Second, we will highlight the role of information in the policy formulation
process. From this we hope to derive important lessons for inflation targeters-to-be.
3.2.1 Definition of the target
The definition of the inflation target varies considerably across countries and over
time. We will discuss briefly the major arguments that have emerged from academic
discussion and practical experience, namely the price level versus inflation rate
targeting debate, the search for the right price index, a plausible numerical
                                                                
31 See Bernanke et al. (1999) and Mishkin (1997).16
specification of the target, the relevant time horizon, and finally, how to deal with the
target bandwidth and deviations.
Price level versus inflation rate targeting
Price stability is commonly described as the main goal of monetary policy. Strictly
interpreted, this goal implies that the purchasing power of money does not vary over
time. Therefore, full price stability (as a goal) could be associated with a procedure
aiming at keeping the price  level constant. However, the desirability of a constant
price level is at least questionable
32.
The important distinction has to be drawn between a constant price level and a zero
inflation rate due to substantial implications for the time series properties. The former
implies policy path-dependence whereas the latter does not. In simple terms, a
(constant) price level target requires a period of deflation to compensate for a period
of unanticipated inflationary shocks. This leads to a stronger short-term variability of
effective inflation rates and – due to nominal rigidities – output than under inflation
rate targeting. On the other hand, with a period-by-period inflation rate target (and a
possible drift in the price level), a one-time inflationary push is not automatically
offset, “bygones are bygones”
33. The resulting base drift in the price level dampens
the accurateness of long-term price level forecasts, which are subject to increasing
variance
34. Price level targeting therefore encourages long-term nominal contracting.
Still, most nominal contracts are short-term and indexation constitutes another way of
reaping the benefits of long-term contracting. In consequence, there seems to be no
outstanding reason in favor of price level targeting.
The discussion on whether to use a price level or inflation rate target seems somewhat
far-fetched. For one, there is actually no country in the world that would apply a strict
price level target
35. Furthermore, one has to acknowledge that there are several factors
                                                                
32 See Numerical target, p. 19.
33 Brunila and Lehdenperä (1995), p. 120.
34 See Duguay (1994) for a review of the price level versus inflation rate discussion, and  Svensson
(1996) for a principal-agent set-up. The latter also stresses the importance of the nature of the shocks
hitting the economy. With a large and eventually more-period shock, which induces continuous and
similar target misses an inflation target might turn out to be less costly in terms of output reduction
during the compensation period. In contradiction to conventional wisdom,  Svensson also makes the
point that a price-level target can be more attractive than inflation rate targeting in the realistic case of
unemployment persistence. It is also considered to reduce the “inflationary bias” of monetary policy.
35 Sweden is said to be the only country having pursued a price level target in the 1930s, see  Jonung
(1979).17
(e.g., quality improvements), which realistically lead to moderate growth in the price
level even without being considered inflation. In addition to that, a case can be made
for the positive effects of non-zero inflation
36. Hence, a constant price level target
lacks practical and theoretical meaning. A price-level target, which includes base
drift, comes close to inflation rate targeting, but might be an interesting alternative to
consider. The argument is easily reformulated: a tradeoff exists between short-term
inflation rate variability (in the case of price level targeting) and longer-term price
level uncertainty (inflation rate targeting).
Following the general view, we will focus in the remaining part of the paper on
inflation rate targeting.
Price index
An inflation target refers to a specific price index, more precisely to its variation.
Ideally, the price index accurately measures the overall change in price level in the
economy, is timely, not subject to revisions and familiar to the general public. The
GDP deflator offers a broad coverage, but is subject to the latter critique and has not
been chosen in IT countries. Two possible ways have emerged from ten years of
experience: targeting a "headline" or an "underlying/core" inflation rate. Both indices
stem from the widely known Consumer Price Index (CPI). Targeting the published or
"headline" CPI seems feasible, but comes with important drawbacks. Since it includes
a number of potentially volatile components, regular CPI has to be "corrected" in
several ways to form the "underlying" rate of inflation. First, monetary policy is
formulated independently from fiscal policy. This implies in turn that changes in
fiscal policy should not have implications for the measurement of the price index. In
other words, direct (first-round) effects from, e.g., a change in the VAT rate on the
price level will be of minor importance for the long-run inflation rate, whereas the
second-round, indirect effects should be included. Another case can be made for
supply shocks: monetary policy should not be held accountable for non-monetary
influences on the price level. This is especially true for categories like energy/fuel, but
also the food sector. In most IT countries, the former is imported from abroad and
therefore subject to (marked) exchange rate movements
37. The latter category, in turn,
                                                                
36 For these arguments, see Numerical target, p.19.
37 For an open-economy treatment of Inflation Targeting, see  Svensson (1998).18
might be excluded because of its generally remarkable weight in the specific country's
index, implying large effects on CPI stemming from rather small changes in food
prices. Third, it is common to exclude (mortgage) interest payments
38. Imagine a
slight overshooting of the predicted interest rate over the target: tightening monetary
policy by increasing short-term interest rates would result in an even larger burden on
households.
Narrowing the CPI in the described way
39 raises the need for communication: the
monetary authority has to explain in detail its assessment of the different components
and the relationship between headline and core CPI. Furthermore, redefining the price
index during the targeting period substantially reduces the central bank's credibility.
This trap is conveniently avoided, if the index compilation lies not within the
responsibility of the monetary authority, but is assigned to some other, independent
agent like the Statistical Office. Given that the main differences between headline and
underlying inflation are of temporary nature, the distinction between the two is
somewhat overstated in the medium-term, i.e., the target horizon.
With regard to European Monetary Union, the point has been made
40 that any form of
CPI targeting might not be acceptable for a group of countries at different stages of
economic development because of the relatively strong weight of non-traded goods in
the index. Focusing on a goods basket where the law of one price is more likely to
rule (like wholesale price indices), reduces this problem, but creates another one:
volatility of the index will be more accentuated than with a "classic" CPI. Concluding,
one might argue that using more than one (price) index is a good way of equilibrating
the different points that have been made. In effect, Canada is using a "monetary
conditions index" in the conduct of monetary policy
41.
                                                                
38 Debelle (1997) notes that these interest payments might even be excluded from headline CPI. This is
the case for the US, but also for Korea. See Hoffmaister (1999) on this point.
39 See Yates (1995) for a more technical discussion of this issue. Bryan and Cechetti (1994) provide a
feasible way of “trimming” the headline CPI. Put simply, they eliminate the upper and lower k% of
the distribution in price changes among the main CPI categories in order to obtain an average change
in prices.  Christoffersen and Wescott (1999) apply this method to Poland.
40 By Artis et al. (1998).
41 This index is a weighted combination of interest and exchange rates, see Bernanke et al. (1999),
chapter 6.19
Numerical target
In implementing its policy, the monetary authority will have to commit to a specific
numerical value for the inflation target. There is widespread debate on how to
concretize Alan Greenspan’s notorious, but qualitative definition of price stability –
the rate of inflation, which does not materially influence economic behavior
42. Along
the lines of the price level versus inflation rate targeting debate, one could argue that
the goal of monetary policy, price stability, might be described as zero inflation.
However, there are a variety of good reasons to aim for positive (but moderate)
inflation.
Fundamentally, there is a methodological issue: CPI measurement is endemically
biased. The "Boskin Report" has outlined
43 several sources of overestimation of the
CPI. Defined as a fixed-weight Laspeyres index
44, the CPI does not provide for short-
term substitution effects due to changes in relative prices. Since households are likely
to redirect their consumption towards goods, which have become relatively less
expensive, a fixed-weight good basket will overestimate the effective expenditure
45.
Other obvious sources of upward biases in estimating CPI, mentioned by  BOSKIN ET
AL. (1996), are outlet substitution, the invention of new products, and the change in
quality of goods, the latter two accounting for more than half of the bias. Even though
the computing agencies (the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US, Eurostat for the
European Union) use sophisticated techniques to minimize these deviations, the
estimation error, according to  BOSKIN, adds on average to some 1.1 per cent  per
annum for the US
46. Put simply, an officially measured inflation rate of 2.5 per cent
implies a "true" rate of inflation of 1-1.5 per cent per annum
47.
                                                                
42 Greenspan (1989), p. 141.
43 Boskin et al. (1996).
44 As opposed to a Cost of Living Index COLI, which was favored by the Commission. The COLI does
not aim at the necessary expenditure for a constant basket, but at the necessary expenditure for
constant household welfare, allowing for substitution effects.
45 As long as no (costly) redefinition of the goods bundle takes place (every 11 years in the US on
average).
46 See the Boskin Report, Table 3, p. VI-4. For the European Union, the corresponding figure can be
expected to lie somewhat below this figure since Eurostat uses for its Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices a different formula (geometric mean instead of arithmetic mean), which leads to lower results
by definition.
47 Fischer (1994), p. 284, fn. 49 offers another bias, which he calls the „logarithm bias“: the decline in
price for a good in one period and a subsequent rise of the same nominal magnitude would be shown
as a positive over-all rise. This point obviously depends on the definition of a period.20
For Germany, the Bundesbank estimated the “Boskin effect” to total .75 per cent per
annum
48.
Leaving aside pure measurement issues, important economic arguments in favor of
low, but positive inflation have been put forward. First, with zero inflation, the real
interest rate cannot be negative because the nominal interest rate is bounded below by
zero. This considerably limits the policymaker’s ability to respond to shocks.
Negative real interest rates might be useful during severe recessions in order to boost
private investment and facilitate economic recovery
49.
The second argument
50 relies on the existence of nominal rigidities in the goods and
labor markets. Consider the labor market: at very low rates of inflation, no adjustment
in real terms (e.g., a reallocation of labor necessitated by a drop in the demand of
labor in a certain sector) will take place. In this situation, positive inflation reduces the
real wage, smoothing relative adjustment, and, thus, enhancing economic efficiency.
This argument depends crucially on the existence of nominal rigidities. Empirical
evidence is mixed, however. Still, for certain countries this argument will hold.
Third, it can be argued that the welfare loss function is asymmetrical around the
optimal inflation rate. The costs of deviation from a zero inflation target are
distributed unevenly: whereas deflation, by raising the real interest rate, can create
costly liquidity and solvency problems, and result in a lower steady-state capital
stock, the costs of small positive inflation are difficult to identify. On the other hand,
these severe effects are not likely to follow from time-to-time dips into negative rates
of price level changes, but from “real” deflation, i.e., substantial, and more-period
price declines.
A fourth argument
51 in favor of positive inflation relates to the theory of optimal
taxation. Put shortly, in presence of distortionary taxes, inflation (as a tax on nominal
assets) may be part of the optimal tax mix. This holds especially for countries, which
encounter problems in raising tax revenue, i.e., developing countries, since the
inflation tax can hardly be avoided. The argument is weakened by the fact that
inflation is considered a rather inefficient and costly way of collecting taxes.
                                                                
48 See Hoffmann (1998).
49 This point was made by Summers (1991). However, the restriction on policy making seems of minor
importance in terms of welfare losses, see Fuhrer and Madigan (1994) on this point.
50 Attributed to Tobin (1972).
51 First made by Phelps (1973).21
Furthermore, as FELDSTEIN (1996) pointed out, due to distortions in tax schemes, even
low positive inflation will cause substantial welfare losses.
Summing up, most inflation targets have centered around 2 to 3 per cent per annum,
as it has been proposed in the literature
52. This value is also pivotal to explicitly non-
inflation targeting central banks like the ECB
53.
Time horizon
The announcement of an inflation target refers to a certain time horizon. One can
establish upper and lower bounds for a reasonable horizon by taking into account the
controllability aspect. Inflation will not be controllable by monetary policy
instruments in the very short run of, say, less than one year due to Friedman’s "long
and variable lags", meaning the time a change in the policy stance (short term interest
rates) takes to work through the transmission mechanism. On the other hand, with a
time horizon of more than, say, five years, IT will lose its meaning and therefore lack
credibility. Hence, the monetary authority faces a tradeoff between flexibility and
transparency: the shorter the time horizon, the less the central bank will be able to act
under discretion. A high degree of short-run accountability runs counter mid- and
long-term discretionary stabilization measures. Another problem derives from the so-
called "instrument instability"
54: the shorter the time horizon for monetary policy to
obey the target, the more volatile or even unstable (due to lagged and possibly
reinforcing effects) the instrument might be. This is of course not a desirable property,
in effect it is well known that strong variability in short-term interest rates has
detrimental effects on long-run growth by reducing investment.
In practice, time horizons vary across countries and over time, also depending on the
actual rate of inflation at the time of IT implementation. In countries, where
disinflation
55 was a major policy goal (and actual inflation above desired inflation,
e.g. Canada and New Zealand), it proved helpful to allow for an implementation
period of one to two years and to set rather short intervals, stressing the accountability
point. Countries, which had already achieved low inflation were able to adhere
                                                                
52 See, e.g., Fischer (1994), p. 284.
53 See e.g. European Central Bank (1998).
54 Developed by Holbrook (1972).
55 As opposed to deflation.22
immediately to their respective long-run inflation target, and, hence, define longer
target horizons (of up to five years).
Target band width and deviations
Here, three alternative formulations of the inflation target are imaginable: the
numerical value can be specified in terms of a (thick) point, as a range around some
center value, or as an upper bound (but, considering the nature of IT, not as a lower
bound). The rationale for a range lies in the imperfect control of monetary policy over
the target. The central bank's decision on the bandwidth is characterized by the same
flexibility-credibility tradeoff that impinges on many other choices in this field. This
can be easily seen in the case of a range. Narrowing the range around the focal point
shows the central bank's strong commitment to achieving the focal point inflation
target. On the other hand, it restricts its ability to act discretionary in implementing
monetary policy. Even optimal monetary policy may not be able to forecast inflation
perfectly and is definitely subject to unforeseen external shocks, thus driving the
inflation rate out of the target band. This event is the more likely to occur, the smaller
the band. Not hitting the target is likely to be destructive for central bank's
credibility
56. A target point will realistically never be hit. Turning the argument
around, the Swiss National Bank has repeatedly made the point that missing a band is
worse than missing a point
57.
It should have become clear so far that setting the bandwidth is somehow analogous
to setting the target horizon. Here, too, we encounter the problem of instrument
                                                                
56 Here, one could argue that one of the most credible monetary authorities, the German Bundesbank,
was not a very prominent "target hitter": between 1975, when the targeting process was initiated after
the breakup of  Bretton Woods, and 1996, when the Bundesbank adopted two-year targets in
preparation of the common European monetary policy, the yearly published target corridor for growth
of the monetary aggregate M3 was missed, 11 out of 22 times completely, and the Bundesbank found
itself just on the edge of the corridor another six times. However, M3 has been in official language an
intermediate target of the Bundesbank's monetary policy, not the final target. Along these lines, the
convincing argument was made (see  Clarida and  Gertler (1997),  Bernanke and  Mihov (1997),
Bernanke et al. (1999), and von Hagen, 1995) that German monetary policy has effectively been
targeting inflation for a long time, since missing the corridor for the monetary aggregate seemingly
did not undermine its credibility in terms of inflation performance. In effect, the corresponding
inflation target has been hit (undershot or overshot by less than one percent point) 15 times during the
same period. The misses, however, are chronologically attributable to the second oil shock and to
German Reunification.
57 Consequently, Switzerland has chosen a point monetary aggregate target, see  Bernanke et al. (1999),
chapter 4.23
instability
58: the narrower the band is, the more abrupt the instrument will have to
react in order to cope with unforeseen shocks to the price level.
Another point in the discussion of target ranges is whether, given an optimal inflation
rate, the range should be symmetric around this value or skewed to one side or the
other. Given that target band deviations result in a credibility loss, one has to consider
the nature of deviations from the target value. Major upward shifts can be due to the
introduction of taxes or other supply factors. Since this type of disturbance is
commonly excluded from the relevant price index
59, there seems to be no major
reason for asymmetric bands.
A deviation from the target, be it a point or a range, calls for a modification of the
policy stance. The question is, however, whether this deviation is of transitory nature
or does it constitute a substantial threat to price stability over the medium term. Only
the latter necessitates a policy response. Some inflation targeting central banks (e.g.,
New Zealand) even preannounce precise situations, which are considered to work as
“escape clauses”, in the sense that no policy reaction is needed.
Difficulties in maintaining the established bandwidth point to a necessary
adjustment/enlargement: in effect, in 1996, New Zealand adjusted its range, widening
it by 1 to 3 percentage points. The focal point of the range remained stable, however.
3.2.2 The role of information: indicators for inflation
As it has already been noted, intermediate money targeting in a extended number of
countries during the 70s and early 80s rested on two propositions: first, intermediate
targets (e.g., money growth) are subject to greater controllability by the central bank
than final targets. Second, the link between money growth and inflation proved rather
stable over this period. So why target the inflation rate directly, with no added value
in terms of inflation outcome, but greater controllability problems?
As it has been alluded to in the introduction, the quality of money growth as an
estimator for future inflation declined for most countries during the 80s and 90s. Since
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money growth is of no intrinsic value, apart from being an indicator for inflation, the
controllability argument favoring intermediate targets breaks down as well
60.
In this sense, choosing IT as monetary policy framework fundamentally means to
internalize the controllability problem. Missing the  ex ante inflation target is no
longer a consequence of flaws in the money growth-inflation relationship (velocity
shocks, money demand instabilities), but the outcome of imperfect inflation forecasts.
This points to the importance of information and forecasting under an IT regime. But
what information should be used?
Due to the “long and variable lags” of monetary policy, IT shows a forward-looking
character: instead of relying on present or past intermediate targets/indicators, it
makes explicit use of forward-looking indicator variables. The main difference is that
these indicator or information variables contribute to monetary policy making without
being a target of monetary policy themselves
61. In addition to that, the information
variable approach does not rest on a causal relationship between indicator and
inflation. Therefore, structural variables with no direct financial implication might
also serve as indicators.
A number of potential indicators have been tested for their informational content in
different countries. Since the indicator quality is closely linked to the financial system
and the transmission mechanism, no cross-country first-best indicator can be
established.
For the UK, BAUMGARTNER AND RAMASWAMY (1996) conclude, using nonstructural
VAR methods, that narrow money has strong leading indicator quality while broad
money has not. This result is straightforward considering the fact that velocity and
money demand side shocks impinge on broad, not on narrow money
62. Furthermore,
                                                                
60 Svensson (1997) has made the often-cited point that IT countries actually do use an intermediate
goal, namely the forecast of inflation. He argues that “it is by definition the current variable that is
most correlated with the goal, it is more controllable than the goal, and it can be made more
observable than the goal.” (p.1114). If the inflation forecast is (too) different from the target, the
central bank’s response will be a modification of monetary policy. In this sense, the inflation
targeting central bank uses more information in the policy making process than intermediate target
strategies, although already at the intermediate level policy has a scent of “look at everything”, at
least everything that is supposed to be relevant for inflation performance.
61 One example is Canada’s monetary conditions index, see footnote 41.
62 Regarding the transmission mechanism, the authors argue that “a full understanding of the structural
features of the transmission mechanism is not a necessary condition for targeting inflation
successfully.”… “More generally, given the lack of consensus on the structural properties of the
monetary transmission mechanism, the information variables approach may, paradoxically, provide
stronger theoretical underpinnings for the conduct of monetary policy [than an intermediate targeting25
they point out that long and short interest rates provide some information for inflation.
Quite interestingly, the yield curve as well as interest rate spreads and nominal
exchange rates on the other hand show little predictive power. However, the authors
also make the point that information deriving from the information variable approach
might not be sufficient for successfully conducting monetary policy and that
additional “out of model” information is needed.
CECCHETTI (1995) uses simple correlation analysis as a test for the predictive power
of different candidate indicators for inflation in the US. Here, the case for money
growth as inflation estimator is much weaker. In conclusion, there is no good (in the
sense of time-invariant) estimator of inflation among those assessed by the author. He
draws, however, another important lesson, which is valid not only for the US: the
difficulty of forecasting inflation. Following  CECCHETTI, even at very low time
horizons, the error of inflation forecasts is remarkably high
63.
3.3 Communication, accountability, and transparency
Taking into account the described features of IT, this monetary strategy can still be
perceived as a more or less rigid rule to be followed. However, it is sometimes
stressed that IT does not constitute “just another rule”, but a new “framework for
policy within which ‘constrained discretion’ can be exercised”
64. So what is it that
goes beyond the classic conduct of monetary policy?
By stressing the importance of continuous communication between the central bank
and the general public, IT enables transparency in the process of monetary policy
making. For many years, central banks had been pursuing their rather general goals
under the veil of a democratic institution without to much attention being paid to these
long-run goals of monetary policy by the general public. This point leads instantly to
another positive by-product of IT, namely the accountability-based approach.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
strategy].” (pp. 4s). For explicit modeling of different transmission mechanisms in monetary union
countries, see Giovannetti and Marimon (1998). See also the papers for the Journal of Economic
Perspectives Symposium on the monetary transmission mechanism,  Mishkin (1995), Taylor (1995),
and Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
63 He finds a RMSE of 1.54, implying a 90% confidence interval of over five percentage points for one-
quarter-ahead US inflation forecasts between 1982 and 1994.  Debelle and Stevens (1995) find
RMSEs for OECD data on G7 countries from 0.5 to 1.5 percent between 1987 and 1992. See also
Hoffmaister (1999) for a detailed assessment of inflation predictability in Korea.
64 Bernanke et al. (1999), p. 22.26
To begin with the latter, there has been increasing concern during the last decade
regarding the institutional foundations of modern central banks. In recent years, a
large number of central bank laws have been modified
65 in order to reflect the
growing need to pin down a more clear-cut democratic role of the central bank,
including the question of accountability.
The general trend moves into the direction of making central banks increasingly more
independent, respecting the empirical finding
66 of an inverse relationship between
central bank independence and inflation.
The distinction already drawn between goal and instrument independence of the
central bank
67 and the target assignment problem in this context leads to a different
conclusion. In terms of accountability, the outside assignment of the IT target to the
central bank provides a benchmark to evaluate the authority’s performance.
Derivations from the established target have to be explained by the bank, i.e., the
central bank is held accountable for achieving its targets. In New Zealand, the
governor can even lose his job in case of continuous (unexplainable) target misses.
Three problems arise, however: first, there is a large gap between the assigned target
(in terms of inflation) and the instrument, commonly the short-term interest rate. As a
consequence, target misses might be attributable to inadequate policy measures, but
also to external shocks.
Second, the role of “lags” in monetary policy has already been acknowledged. The
fact that policy results become visible only after several quarters (implying also a
mid-run target horizon), again stresses the importance of communication: providing
information to the public will increase the central bank’s accountability (which can be
even seen as a bad), but also its credibility if not the reputation.
Finally, there is considerable concern that the central bank is not the only powerful
institution to provide inflation measurement. In most countries, statistical offices are
responsible for ex post assessment of price behavior. However, policy actions are
based on inflation forecasts several years in advance. It is clear that these forecasts
have to be impartial and reliable. This point gains even more importance with the
                                                                
65 Most Western European central bank laws had to be harmonized with EMU standards (see European
Monetary Institute (1995)) whereas most CEECs have tried to model successful Western central bank
charters (see Loungani and Sheets (1997) for the transition countries and Knight  et al. (1997) for the
Baltics and countries of the Former Soviet Union). The role of central banks in developing countries
however differs radically from that in advanced economies, see Fry  et al. (1996).
66 See footnote 23.
67 See Target assignment and fiscal non-dominance, p.  12.27
SVENSSON-argument of intermediate inflation forecast targeting: using the monetary
authority’s own forecast allows for biased information in order to ease and/or improve
policy outcome. Private sector forecasts, on the other hand, suffer possibly from
serious information asymmetries (the central bank’s reaction function)
68. The
“solution” lies once more in the bank’s openness to the public. It could, e.g. publish
its forecast models or provide them to an independent (governmental) authority,
which would be responsible for bringing together public and private inflation
forecasts.
As we have seen, monetary policy can only be held accountable, if changes in the
policy stance are made public. This holds also for the process of policy formulation,
i.e., the IT framework, the mid-run policy strategy and the rationale behind it. The
monetary authority should also provide information about the outlook of the
economy, confronting its own analyses with private sector forecasts. Most
importantly, in order to gain sustained public credibility, the central bank is supposed
to publish progress reports, which the achievements of monetary policy relative to its
targets are discussed and, in case of failure, explained.
In practice, all IT central banks have attained high levels of communication. In fact,
the degree of transparency is often considered a striking feature of this group
69. The
classic vehicles of accountability include annual reports and testimonies to democratic
institutions like the parliament or committees. IT countries have begun to publish so-
called inflation reports, the prototype being the semi-annual Monetary Policy
Statement by the Governor of the central bank of New Zealand. This type of report
focuses explicitly on the inflation target, discussing whether it has been met and why
not. In addition to that, most IT countries provide supplementary documentation on
the economic background. Some even publish the minutes of the central bank’s board
meetings
70. A very common way (heavily used by the ECB) of communicating the
monetary authority’s intentions is to publish speeches of board members and regular
bulletins.
                                                                
68 Romer and Romer (1996b) show that the Federal Reserve has continuously outperformed private
sector inflation forecasts.
69 See, e.g. Haldane (1997).
70 In the UK, these minutes refer to the meetings between the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank
of England.28
A handsome byproduct of central bank openness derives from the fact that monetary
policy discussions under an IT framework are automatically geared towards a mid-run
time horizon of, say, not less than two years. If the public understanding of
(monetary) policy problems is notably increased by this communication-oriented
approach, then the central bank’s inflation forecasts might become an effective
counterweight to shortsighted political pressures.
Summing up, we find that communication of monetary policy matters increases
transparency and creates greater public understanding, which, in turn, is extremely
helpful for the successful conduct of IT. On the other hand, making the central bank
accountable for policy outcomes works as a counterweight to the growing trend
towards increased (instrument) independence.29
4 Country experience
This chapter will review the actual implementation of IT frameworks. Without going
into country-specific details of how to “fine-tune” the new regime of monetary policy,
we consider two major aspects: first, the timing of the framework’s adoption. So far, a
handful of countries have started targeting inflation, dispersed over the last ten years.
How did these countries determine when to introduce IT? And second, how about the
outcome? Did these countries perform well over the years of targeting inflation, also
in comparison to countries not adhering to IT?
4.1 The timing of implementation
The story told by history is straightforward: major changes in the monetary policy
regime take place under extreme economic conditions, e.g. ending Argentine
hyperinflation by converting the central bank into a currency board arrangement
(CBA). Hence, one might suspect the introduction of IT to be an answer to periods of
high or growing inflation. Without going into detail, there is one fundamental
difference, however: while a CBA is credible by definition, the IT-introducing central
bank is not. In order to build up reputation, the monetary authority has to make sure
that the initial inflation targets are met with high probability. These targets in turn lie
supposedly at or below the lower bound of the specific country’s inflation track
record. Introducing IT during a period of falling inflation can thus be considered a
tactical decision, but it is one that proves to be extremely helpful. By fulfilling the
early goals, the monetary policy maker should be able to “lock in” disinflationary
expectations of the public. Credible mid-run inflation targets then contribute to anchor
inflation expectations in the longer run, even in the case of inflationary shocks.
Summing up, the introduction of an IT framework in general has not served as a
means to end a period of unsustainable monetary policy and high inflation
71.
In our sample of countries, IT has been introduced in two ways: several countries,
such as New Zealand or Sweden, have made a discrete effort to communicate to the
public that “a new era has begun”. Adoption of the IT framework as part of a major
(not only monetary) policy reform, or after the breakdown of the European Exchange30
Rate Mechanism, mark a one-stop strategy. The opposite is true for countries such as
Canada: slow and gradual introduction of IT procedures aimed at conserving the
public’s belief in monetary policy institutions, given that there was no economic
rupture causing distrust.
The countries differed also in another way: While in New Zealand and Canada IT
came as an agreement between government and central bank, other countries, e.g.
Finland and Sweden, lacked the explicit endorsement of this new monetary policy
framework by the fiscal policymaker. It goes without saying that endorsement by the
government substantially increases the credibility of IT.
4.2 Inflation performance
Table 1 shows the path of inflation in eight inflation targeting countries, as well as a
control group, consisting of the US, Germany, France, Japan, and a more generic set
of industrialized countries. The years in which IT was introduced are framed.
Table 1: Consumer Price Inflation (change in % from previous year)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
New Zealand 15.7 6.4 5.7 6.0 2.6 1.0 1.4 1.7 3.7 2.3 1.1 1.2
Canada 4.4 4.0 5.1 4.7 5.6 1.5 1.9 0.2 2.2 1.5 1.7 1.0
United Kingdom 4.1 4.8 7.8 9.5 5.9 3.7 1.5 2.5 3.4 2.5 3.1 3.4
Finland 4.1 5.1 6.6 6.2 4.1 2.6 2.2 1.1 0.9 0.6 1.3 1.4
Sweden 3.9 6.3 7.1 9.9 9.0 2.8 4.5 2.6 2.5 0.5 0.8 -0.1
Australia 8.5 7.3 7.5 7.3 3.2 1.0 1.8 1.9 4.7 2.6 0.3 0.9
Spain 5.3 4.8 6.8 6.7 5.9 5.9 4.5 4.8 4.6 3.6 2.0 1.8
Israel 19.8 16.4 20.1 17.2 19.0 11.9 11.0 12.3 10.1 11.3 9.0 5.5
US 3.7 4.0 4.9 5.4 4.2 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.4 1.5
Germany 0.2 1.2 2.8 2.7 3.6 5.1 4.4 2.7 1.9 1.5 1.8 0.9
France 3.3 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.2 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.1 0.7
Japan 0.1 0.7 2.2 3.1 3.3 1.7 1.2 0.7 -0.1 0.2 1.7 0.6
Industrial countries 3.2 3.5 4.6 5.2 4.4 3.3 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.0 1.4
Source: Author’s calculations, based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.
At first glance, IT seems to have been a full success in all adhering countries. In fact,
during the year after introduction, every country, but Australia (and perhaps Spain)
recorded a discrete drop of its inflation rate, Israel being the extreme case of –7%.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
71 The commonly overlooked IT country Israel serves as (the only) counterexample: IT had been
introduced in 1991 when inflation was in the 20%-range and the fiscal deficit at unsustainable 14% of31
Since the Australian Reserve Bank’s target range amounted to 2-3 per cent, the
continuity comes as no surprise. Spain, on the other hand, being a member of the
ERM, had to respect margins of ±15% for its Peseta to fluctuate around the ECU
parity. In this sense, IT was of secondary importance in Spain and the monetary
policymaker could not adjust its instruments more drastically in order to reduce
further the rate of inflation.
We hereby mean any action aiming at reducing inflation  expectations. Of course,
driving up interest rates has only limited effect on the inflation rate in the short run
(the year after IT introduction). As a corollary, we observe that there is an expectation
component in actual inflation, which is reduced markedly with the introduction of an
IT framework. Turning the argument around, we conclude that IT is a credible way of
communicating inflation aversion and thus, conducting monetary policy.
Turning from the absolute drop in inflation to relative goal achievement, i.e., in terms
of the inflation target, we observe without giving further evidence that actual inflation
was in general within the bandwidth or close to the thick point after a relatively short
adjustment period
72.
The apparent success of the IT framework is somehow qualified by the lower part of
Table 1. On average, all industrialized countries have experienced a decline in
inflation during the 90s
73. Loosely speaking, the IT group (with the exception of
Israel) has experienced a sharper decline in inflation from above the industrial
countries’ level to find themselves at a comparable level from 1994 onwards
74. Chart
1, which is based on Table 1, visualizes this fact: the inflation path in IT countries as
opposed to the one of the industrial countries
75. Excluding Israel (as statistical outlier)
from the IT community makes the point even clearer.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
GDP, see Bernanke et al. (1999).
72 See Debelle (1997) for a detailed assessment by country.
73 Here, “industrial countries” as defined by the IMF include most of the IT countries.
74 We notice however, that the UK lately reveals rather high rates of inflation, not in coherence with the
US pattern.
75 In order to account for the differing chronological points in time when IT was introduced, we follow
Fischer et al. (1998) and compute the data relative to the year of its introduction, referring to “IT
time” as opposed to “calendar time”. The inflation rate for IT countries is a non-weighted average.
The time anchor for the OECD group is 1993, since most IT countries adopted the new framework





























































































FISCHER (1995) concludes that the impressive success of New Zealand and other
countries is due to the fact that IT was introduced during a period of generally falling
rates of inflation. He argues that the real test of its credibility and power is to come
with an overheating economy. A transitory shock to the price level could probably not
single out the countries where the central bank has effectively lowered the public’s
inflation expectations because of the target rate’s definition
76.
This assessment of inflation performance is of very preliminary nature, however.
More sophisticated tests could focus on the terms of the inflation-output tradeoff
77,
the behavior of inflation with and without IT, or on the question, if and how the
private sector’s inflation expectations have been lowered
78.
                                                                
76 By this, we mean the exclusion of first-round effects of exogenous shocks on the price level, see
Price index, p.17.
77 I.e. the sacrifice ratio, see Fuhrer (1994).
78 See Bernanke et al. (1999) on this.33
5 Perspectives for Central and Eastern Europe
5.1 Overview
Merely all countries in CEE have embarked on the journey from a centrally planned
state economy to a market economy by Western standards. The most advanced among
these transition countries have moved impressively down the road to macroeconomic
stabilization. The marked output decline, which stood at the very beginning of the
transformation process, due to labor reallocation within each country, has been
stopped everywhere and several countries have already rebounded to pre-crisis
levels
79.
In terms of inflation, most transition countries have experienced triple digit rates of
price increases. Table 2 summarizes the history of inflation in ten CEECs, as well as
Malta and Cyprus
80. Quite interestingly, the disinflationary process in the first five
countries seems to have slowed down at a low double-digit level, whereas several
second-tier countries, which are generally considered less advanced relative to their
neighbors, have come down even further.
Table 2: Consumer Price Inflation (change in % from previous year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Czech Republic 9.5 56.7 11.1 20.8 10.1 9.1 8.8 8.4 10.7
Estonia 23.1 212.5 1069.3 89.0 47.7 28.8 23.1 10.6 10.7
Hungary 29.2 34.2 23.0 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.5 18.3 14.4
Poland 600.0 76.4 43.0 35.3 33.3 26.8 20.1 15.9 11.7
Slovenia 549.7 117.7 201.3 31.9 19.8 12.6 9.7 9.1 8.6
Bulgaria 23.9 339.0 79.4 73.1 95.9 62.1 123.0 1082.3 22.3
Latvia 10.5 124.7 958.0 108.8 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.5 4.6
Lithuania 8.4 224.7 1020.5 409.6 72.1 39.7 24.6 8.9 5.1
Romania 4.7 174.4 211.2 255.2 136.8 32.2 38.8 154.8 59.1
Slovak Republic 10.8 78.3 9.0 25.1 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7
Cyprus 4.5 5.0 6.6 4.8 4.7 2.6 3.0 3.6 2.2
Malta 3.0 2.5 1.7 4.1 4.1 4.0 2.6 3.1 n.a.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.
                                                                
79 See Fischer et al. (1998).
80 We note that these 10/12 countries have been admitted to enter negotiations with the European
Commission in order to prepare their accession to the EU. In May 1998, the Commission started
negotiations with the five most advanced applicant countries, the so-called first-tier acceding
countries, namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The second tier
compromises Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the Slovak Republic. Malta and Cyprus do
not count among these (Eastern) enlargement candidates due to their distinct political and economic
background.34
With the implementation of the Euro as of January 1, 1999, the next milestone in
European integration will be the accession process of Central and East European
Countries (CEEC) to the European Union. As the European Commission puts it in the
Agenda 2000:
“Enlargement is expected to take place in stage 3 of EMU. All Member
States must endorse the aim of EMU, and thus should be able to
participate in time in the Euro area. While it is unlikely that at the time of
their entry, the new Member States will be in a position to participate fully
in the Euro area, the major challenge for them will not be to enter the
Euro area, but to adopt the Community acquis in the area of EMU even as
non-participating countries.”
81
Along these lines, “upgrading” monetary policy institutions and strategies to
acceptable levels of performance has been a major task for CEECs. Following OECD
examples, low and stable inflation has quickly been accepted as a necessary condition
for sustained economic growth
82. Partly due to the lack of institutional capacity,
several countries have relied on “simple” monetary strategies, most prominently an
exchange rate anchor in order to govern public expectations
83.
As these countries move on towards EU membership and as their institutional
capacity grows, the choice of an exchange rate target might turn out to be a good
point to start monetary policy, but probably not one to end up with. Hence, the
question of a “natural sequencing”
84 of monetary policy regimes comes up. In this
context, we obviously focus on the point whether IT could be a viable strategy for
CEECs.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss the applicability of IT following a
couple of criteria established by the IMF, namely fiscal non-dominance over
monetary policy and the question of target competition in monetary policy.
                                                                
81 See European Commission (1997).
82 Ghosh (1997) identifies for the transition countries a threshold effect at 10 per cent inflation per year,
above which high economic growth is unlikely to occur.
83 See Feldman and Temprano-Arroyo (1998).
84 See Begg (1998).35
5.2 Applicability of Inflation Targeting in developing/transition countries
MASSON  ET AL. (1997) established the prerequisites already introduced for the
adoption of an IT framework (fiscal non-dominance, no competing targets/anchors)
85.
These criteria have been widely accepted as a way to describe a promising
environment for successful monetary policy. Few authors have looked after the
applicability of IT in developing/transition countries
86. WAGNER (1998) focuses on
transition countries, describing monetary policy in more general terms, however. He
concludes briefly that “in particular in transition countries, adopting … inflation
targeting would probably be unwise” (p. 24), arguing that none of the criteria he
describes (fiscal non-dominance, inflation as the sole target, technical capacity for
policy formulation and implementation) can be deemed fulfilled for most of the
countries in question.
This preliminary conclusion lacks a detailed assessment of the multiple prerequisites.
Furthermore, we suspect that CEECs will eventually diverge in their institutional
setting and economic background, and therefore in their readiness to apply IT.
5.2.1 Central bank independence and seigniorage
The first point to consider, fiscal non-dominance, has two main aspects. First, there is
the institutional question of whether central banks in CEE have already attained de
jure a level of independence similar to Western central banks. As we outlined above,
this is not to say complete (i.e. goal and instrument) independence from the fiscal
policymaker, but the possibility to freely choose the instruments in order to fulfill a
target, which may bet set by the government.
All EU-acceding countries in Central Europe have adopted new central bank laws
during the 90s. This issue has emerged as a crucial element of financial sector reform,
and of the transformation process in general. Amendments shadowed Western
prototypes more or less rigorously. Most contributions, which focus on the
institutional aspects
87, come to the conclusion that especially the more advanced
reform states have implemented central banks which “enjoy a high degree of
                                                                
85 See Prerequisites, p. 11.
86 Exceptions are Debelle and Lim (1998) for the Philippines, and Christoffersen and Wescott (1999)
for Poland.36
statutory, political, and policy independence.”
88 This comprises a clear definition of
the role and responsibilities of the governor, financial/budgetary and personal
independence, and clear accountability provisions. Most authors, however, make the
point that statutory independence may differ from de facto independence due to
political influence. Especially if central bank laws are incomplete, the door is opened
to asymmetric interaction between the monetary and the fiscal policymaker.
Second, leaving legal aspects aside, fiscal dominance is hard to describe and even
harder to measure. Here, we use a common indicator, namely the degree to which
governments recourse to seigniorage revenues due to a weak tax system. While in
advanced countries seigniorage is negligible, developing countries do rely on this way
of raising revenue. Seigniorage obviously reduces statutory independence. In the
context of developing countries, it is hence the de facto central bank independence
that is important.
Chart 2 presents some evidence on seigniorage in CEECs
89 and industrialized
countries.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
87 See for EU accession countries Hochreiter and Riesinger (1995), and Radzyner and Riesinger (1997).
Lybek (1999) focuses on the Baltics, Russia, and the Former Soviet Union; Äimä (1998) on the
Baltics.
88 See Hochreiter and Riesinger (1995), p. 20.
89 We follow Masson et al. (1997) in defining seigniorage as the annual change in the monetary base
divided by nominal GDP. This simple measure suffers from methodological shortcomings, but has
the advantage of cross-country comparability, see Masson et al. (1997) footnote 29, 30, and appendix
1.37
Source: Author’s calculations, based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.
While first-tier accession countries seem to reduce or hold constant their recourse to
seigniorage financing, there is no clear message regarding second-tier countries. The
level of seigniorage in CEECs, however, lies considerably above developed country
standards. It goes without saying that this approach suffers from serious data
restrictions. First, it is difficult to estimate seigniorage behavior before the opening of
the Eastern Hemisphere, due to lack of data and/or incomparability. Second, even
during the transition process, data will be incomplete or, in some cases, at least
questionable. This is why we restrict our assessment to the rather short periods of
1992-95 and 1994-97.
A further exercise is to compare these results to the reliance on seigniorage in IT
countries before implementation of the new framework.  MASSON ET AL. (1997)
estimate that for the seven major IT countries
90, the average annual rate of seigniorage
between 1980 and 1991 has amounted to 0.59 percent of GDP (and, interestingly
enough, has not moved significantly after IT introduction)
91. This figure is well below
the level in Central and Eastern Europe (annual average 4.24% for the period 1992-
                                                                
90 See Table 1, except for Israel.


























97), but most IT countries have not experienced an economic history, which comes
close to the transformation process. As already stated, we observe a trend towards
lower levels of seigniorage in first-tier accession countries. The point we want to
make here is that the remodeling of central bank laws in CEE has created dynamics,
which take time to become effective. The decline in seigniorage is in our view a first
sign of diminishing influence of the fiscal policymaker on the monetary policy stance.
In other words, new central bank laws in more advanced reform countries have been
slightly more effective in terms of de facto central bank independence than those in
second-tier accession countries.
Summing up, the main conclusion of this investigation into seigniorage behavior is
that first-tier accession countries seem to qualify for an Inflation Targeting framework
as soon as central bank law amendments have become effective. This will surely be
the case several years from now. As far as second-tier accession countries are
concerned, a less optimistic view arises: not only that seigniorage levels are too high
to indicate a de facto independence of the central bank, even a clear trend seems to be
lacking towards a (slow) fading out of the creation of revenue by seigniorage. Hence,
these countries cannot be considered ready for the adoption of a policy framework
building on de facto central bank independence.
5.2.2 Competing goals in EU-Accession: The role of the exchange rate
It is commonly argued that Inflation Targeting requires inflation to be the only or
overriding target of monetary policy
92. CEECs however have made substantial use of
the exchange rate during the 90s in order to facilitate economic stabilization. As in the
case of Italy
93, pegging the exchange rate to a “stable” currency will reduce inflation
since inflationary effects of devaluation are eliminated. Furthermore, a sustainable
peg will allow transferring credibility from the strong to the weak country. A
drawback of an exchange rate peg is the danger of continuous real appreciation, if the
domestic inflation rate lies above the rate of the main trading partners. With
increasing overvaluation, the peg becomes less credible and the country in question
faces speculative attacks.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
91 See Masson et al. (1997), table 3.
92 See, e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999).39
Several countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Estonia being the most prominent)
have adopted credible pegs in the form of a currency board arrangement (CBA).
Others employ a crawling peg (Hungary, Poland) or a managed float exchange rate
regime (Czech Republic, Slovenia),  de facto shadowing a Western currency or a
basket
94. These middle-of-the-road arrangements imply considerable discretion for the
monetary authorities in ranking their policy goals. The common focus on the
exchange rate however is closely linked to the fact that all these countries can be
considered “small open economies”. The more open an economy is, the heavier it
depends on the exchange rate as a policy instrument. One simple measure of openness
is to set average ex-/imports in relation to GDP. A quick look at the data given in
Table 3
95 reveals that the sample IT countries have not experienced dramatic
modifications in their degree of openness before and after the adoption of the new
framework
96. Also, deviations from the mean are rather negligible. Poland and
Hungary can be considered similar in this sense: their degree of openness lies in the
20-30 percent range, too, with rather small deviations over time. Czech Republic and
Estonia appear considerably more open (a caveat regarding Estonian data applies),
presumably relying to a larger extent on the exchange rate
97.
Table 3: Degree of openness (in % of GDP)
Average 1990-98 Standard deviation Average 1980-89 Standard deviation




New Zealand 22.64% 0.77% 22.69% 2.58%
Canada 27.68% 5.08% 23.28% 1.28%
Australia 15.13% 0.99% 14.10% 0.69%
Source: Author’s calculations, based on IMF, International Financial Statistics.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
93 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988).
94 For the remainder of this chapter we focus on these first-tier accession countries since they are more
likely to adopt an IT framework.
95 Imports are measured on c.i.f. basis, except for Czech Republic (f.o.b.). We exclude Slovenia from
our sample due lack of data. In the Estonian case, serious concern about the data reliability is
adequate.
96 Taking two periods from 1980-89 and from 1990-98 is coherent with the introduction of IT in New
Zealand (1990) and Canada (early 1991), less so with Australia (1993). Since Australian figures
hardly vary over time, a more adequate period subdivision does not modify the results.
97 Note that, following this measure, the US and the EU are extremely closed economies, ranging
slightly below (EU) or above (US) 10 percent. For a discussion of the role of the Euro exchange rate
for European monetary policy, see Scheide and Solveen (1997).40
Among IT countries in the sample, Canada is the most open one. Furthermore, the
degree of openness has grown from 22% in 1990 to almost 35% in 1998. Interestingly
enough, Canada uses as information variable in the forecasting process a monetary
conditions index (MCI), which is based on interest and exchange rates.
In our view, this constitutes a viable road for CEECs, willing to target inflation. Due
to the openness of most Central and Eastern European Countries (including those in
the second tier), the exchange rate constitutes a pivotal policy instrument. However,
this does not imply that these economies have to “content” themselves with simple
exchange rate targeting. As transition economies grow, external stabilization via the
exchange rate looses importance to domestic policy goals, which can be better
pursued by following other monetary strategies. At this point, IT comes into the
game: openness does not impede successful targeting of inflation, since there is an
easy way to account for it. Following the Canadian example, transition economies
could rely on a monetary conditions index as an information variable to predict future
inflation. Stressing the predominant role of exchange rates in the MCI, these countries
could arguably respect the importance of international trade for their country and, on
the other hand, move from a merely exchange-rate-based approach to a more
sophisticated framework for monetary policy.41
6 Conclusion
There is a clear trend towards Inflation Targeting as monetary policy framework.
Roughly ten countries have already adopted it or are in the process of implementation,
Korea, Poland, and possibly the Philippines being the latest arrivals.
After the breakdown of intermediate monetary targeting, the inflation rate has
emerged as “natural” goal of monetary policy. A case can be made for targeting low
and stable inflation on a wide variety of grounds. Most importantly, a number of
studies have found an inverse relationship between inflation and economic growth.
IT cannot be viewed as a strict “rule” of monetary policy. In a promising environment
for IT, the central bank is able to freely choose and set its instruments in order to
accomplish the overriding goal of price stability and possible non-competing
secondary goals. On an operational level, most adhering monetary authorities target
the inflation rate (instead of the price level) as measured by a corrected CPI (core
inflation). Accounting for a measurement bias, they commonly target a range of two
to three percent around the actually intended value for inflation. Given that Inflation
Targeting essentially means inflation forecast targeting, the role of inflation indicators
cannot be overestimated. Indicator quality varies across countries, but forecasting
errors remain considerable. Increased transparency of monetary policy and clear
accountability of the central bank comes as a by-product of IT: adhering countries
have reached a high degree of communication between the monetary authority and the
public.
Regarding the outcome of IT, the empirical data is overwhelming: nearly all countries
have experienced a discrete drop in actual inflation right the year after introduction.
This can be seen as a secondary effect of IT. We argue that the adoption of the new
framework lowered the public’s inflation expectations, actual changes in monetary
would have taken more time to work through the transmission mechanism.
Turning to Central and Eastern Europe, we conclude that seigniorage revenues are a
distinct feature of all transition economies, especially those which form the second-
tier EU-accession countries. On the other hand, all countries have modified their42
respective central banking laws along Western European lines. Taking into account
the time these constitutional changes take to become effective, we see a case for
several advanced transition economies, such as Czech Republic or Hungary, to follow
the Polish example and seriously consider Inflation Targeting as a possible framework
for monetary policy.43
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